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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

U-M INVESTMENTS, a Utah
limited partnership,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DALE V. RAY and PHEBE RAY,
his wife; JAY c. HANSEN and
ARDELLE H. HANSEN, his wife;
BARRY RANDALL and DEMA RANDALL,
his wife; FRED BERGSTROM and
CONNIE BERGSTROM, his wife;
BOWARD THORLEY and TREVA PEG
TBORLEY, his wife; w. GARY
RINEHART and GENEVIEVE v.
RINEHART, his wife; LAWRENCE
D. LAWLOR and BARBARA J.
LAWLOR, his wife; TERREL L.
BIRD and JANET L. BIRD, his
wife,
Defendants.
vs.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN TITLE AND
ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, DOUGLAS w. CHURCH
and FRANKLIN H. BUTTERFIELD,
Third-Party
Defendants.
TERRELL L. BIRD and JANET
L. BIRD,
Appellants,
vs.
HOSS A. RAY and PERRY RAY,
Respondents.

Case No. 19121

APPELLANTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE

OF CASE

This is an action to recover a judgment against two
sureties on a supersedeas bond.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court dismissed appellants' motion for
judgment against the sureties, holding in effect that the
supersedeas bond did not cover the face amount of the
judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the ruling of the trial
court.

The case should be remanded with instructions to

enter judgment against the sureties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After the trial and retrial of a very complex case
involving numerous parties and issues, appellants Terrel L.
Bird and Janet L. Bird (hereinafter referred to as "Birds")
obtained a judgment against defendants, Dale V. Ray, Fred
Bergstrom and others, in the amount of $128,500.00 plus
interest (R-1, Page 7; R-2, Page 7).
Ray and Bergstrom appealed the District Court judgment
to the Utah Supreme Court, and the appeal was eventually
dismissed.

U.M. Investments v. Ray, et al. (Utah 1982),

658 P.2d 1186.
-
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In order to prevent Birds from executing on the judgment
while the appeal was pending, Ray and Bergstrom posted a
supersedeas bond in the amount of $128,500.00, being the
exact amount of the judgment (R-4).1

The sureties on the

bond were Ross A. Ray and Perry Ray.
After the appeal was dismissed, Birds moved in accordance with Rule 73(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and in
accordance with the terms of the supersedeas bond for judgment against the sureties (R-5).

The sureties, Ross and

Perry Ray, resisted the motion, and after hearing arguments
and reviewing briefs submitted by the parties, the trial
court dismissed Birds' motion for judgment (R-9).2

The

trial court in effect ruled that the supersedeas bond covered
costs and damages but not the face amount of the judgment.
Although there were numerous parties to the original
action, the issues on appeal relate solely to appellants Bird
and the sureties Ross and Perry Ray.

1 The complete supersedeas bond is reproduced at Appendix I of this brief.
2 Rule 73(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
enforcement against the sureties on motion, without the
necessity of an independent action. An order denying motion
for judgment on an appeal bond is an appealable order.
Merritt v. J. A. Stafford Company, 440 p;2d 927 (Cal. 1968).

-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPERSEDEAS BOND WAS INTENDED TO COVER
PAYMENT OF THE JUDGMENT
The extent of liability under a supersedeas bond must be
determined in accordance with the real or the presumed intention of the parties.

Aviation Credit Corporation v. Conner

Airlines, Inc. (5th Cir. 1962), 307 F.2d 685.

Under the

language of the supersedeas bond in the instant case, the
sureties promise that the appellants will pay all damages and
costs which may be awarded on appeal or on a dismissal thereof, not exceeding $128,500.00, plus interest at 12% from the
date of judgment.

Although the language of the bond is

stated in terms of damages, rather than payment of the judgment, it is Birds' position that the clear intention of the
parties was to cover the judgment amount.

The supersedeas

bond taken as a whole, the statutory requirements relating to
said bonds, the very purpose of the bond, and all of the surrounding circumstances clearly support such an intention.
Specifically, the factors evidencing the intent of the parties are as follows:
1.

Statutory Requirements.

Rule 73(d), Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, provides that whenever a stay on appeal is
desired, the appellant shall present a supersedeas bond.

- 3 -

The

cule provides: 3
"The bond shall be conditioned for
of the judgment in full, together
terest, and damages for delay, if
the appeal is dismissed or if the
affirmed

the satisfaction
with costs, infor any reason
judgment is

When the judgment is for the recovery of money not
otherwise secured, the amount of the bond shall be
fixed at such sum as will cover the whole aiiiOiiilt of
the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs on appeal,
interest, and damages for delay, unless the court
after notice and hearing and for good cause shown
fixes a different amount •
•
Thus, it is clear from the rule, that unless the Court after
notice and hearing fixes a different amount, a supersedeas
bond must be conditioned upon the satisfaction of the
judgment in full.

It would be unreasonable to presume that

the parties intended to execute and file a bond that
materially varied from the statutory requirements.
Generally, parties are presumed to be contracting under
existing law, and every contract impliedly contains the laws
existing at the time.

Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc.

v.

Industrial Commisson, 583 P.2d 53 (Otah 1978); Quagliana v.
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301 (Otah 1975).
2.

Amount of-the Bond.

The amount of the supersedeas

bond is the exact amount of the judgment - $128,500.00,
plus interest at 12% from the date of the judgment.

That

dmnunt, including the interest, is mentioned both in the
3 The applicable rules in their entirety are reproduced at
Appendix II of this brief.
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recitation clause and the undertaking clause of the supersedeas bond.

Two references to this exact amount in such a

short document are not merely coincidental, but are indicative of the intention of the parties.

The fact that the

judgment amount and the bond amount are identical is strongly
indicative that the sureties intended to be bound for the
payment of the judgment.
3.

Existence of Separate Cost Bond.

It is important to

note that the appellants posted a $300.00 cost bond under
Rule 73(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the
$128,500.00 supersedeas bond (R-3).

The fact that two

separate bonds were filed is further indication that the
parties intended the supersedeas bond to in fact be a
supersedeas bond and not something less.
4.

Purpose of the Supersedeas Bond.

It is elementary

that the whole purpose of a supersedeas bond is to secure the
prevailing party.

At 9 Moore's Federal Practice §208.06(2)

(2d. Ed. 57) it is stated as follows:
RThe conditions of the supersedeas bond follow from
the nature of the bond itself. The purpose for requiring a bond is to secure the prevailing party
against any loss that he may sustain as a result of
an ineffectual appeal".
Contracts are to be construed in such manner as to give
effect to the purpose which the parties sought to accomplish.

Stangl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976).

If the

supersedeas bond is construed as respondents would contend,
-
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the entire purpose would be frustrated.

In fact, the bond

would become meaningless and worthless to the prevailing
party.
5.

Construction Against Party Using Words.

The super-

sedeas bond was filed by the original appellants and their
sureties.

Birds had nothing to do with the preparation of

the bond.

As stated in Christopher v. Larsen Ford Sales,

Inc. 557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976), it is the policy of the law
to look with disfavor upon semi-concealed or obscure self
protecting provisions in a document prepared by one party,
which the other party is not likely to notice.

Any uncer-

tainties or ambiguities are to be resolved against the party
drawing it.

Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931 (Utah

1975); Wells Fargo Bank v. Midwest Realty and Finance Com554. P.2d 882 (Utah 1975).

6.

Title.

The document filed with the court is titled

"supersedeas bond".
parties intent.

The title itself is an indication of the

If the instrument is construed in accordance

with the contention of the respondents, then the instrument
is simply not a supersedeas bond as that term is used in Rule
73(d).

The appellants and sureties called the document a

supersedeas bond; Birds relied upon it as being a supersedeas
bond; and this Court ought to construe it as a supersedeas
bond.

It has been held that the sureties on a superdeas bond

are estopped from denying the recitals contained in the bond.
- 6 -

Pratt v. Gilbert, 8 Utah 54; 29 Pac. 965 (1892).

They like-

wise should be estopped from claiming that it is something
other than what is represented by its title.
7.

Fraud Upon the Court and Parties.

If the language

of the supersedeas bond was deliberately framed so as to
exclude the judgment from the undertaking under the bond,
then such conduct would seem to approach fraud upon the Court
and the parties.

If such were the case, the sureties would

have deliberately filed a bond that was not in compliance
with the statutes; would have called it something that it
wasn't; would have used numerical figures to mislead the parties; and would have filed an illusionary instrument.

Cer-

tainly if such were the case, the sureties should not now be
permitted to benefit from such conduct.

Birds do not ser-

iously contend that the parties committed a fraud.

Rather,

they urge that it was always the clear intention of the
sureties to be bound upon the supersedeas bond in the
customary manner.

It would be unreasonable to interpret the

language of the bond in such a way as to imply a fraud.
8.

Damages.

Under the language of the bond, the sure-

ties undertake to pay all "damages" awarded against the
appellants on appeal.

It is again important to note that the

bond language is not "damages for delay" as that term is used
in Rule 73(d), but is an unrestricted use of the word
"damages".

In the broad sense, the term damages covers any

- 7 -

compensation or indemnity which may be recovered in
the courts by any person who has suffered loss, detriment or
injury.

BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 466 (4th Ed. 1951).

Therefore the amount of the judgment awarded to Birds does
represent damages suffered by them.

The term damages can

easily be construed to include the judgment.

Looking at the

supersedeas bond as a whole, would compel such a construction. 4
9.

Interest.

If the supersedeas bond was not intended

to cover the judgment, why would it provide for the sureties
to pay interest at the judgment rate, and from the date of
judgment?

If the damages were something different from the

judgment, there would be no logic at all in backcharging interest on the damages to the date of the judgment.
answer is obvious.

The

The whole intention of the parties was to

bond for payment of the judgment, and the interest provision
dovetails with that intention.
When all of the above factors are considered together,
the intention of the parties becomes crystal clear.

The

supersedeas bond was intended to cover the face amount of the
iudgment plus interest.

Any other interpretation would do

·1iolence to the language of the instrument, the requirements
uf

the statute, and the purpose sought to be accomplished.

4 For further authorities, see Page 9, supra.
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The sureties cited to the lower court, and will undoubtedly cite to this Court, cases from other jurisdictions to
the effect that bonds must be strictly construed.

Some of

the cases do in fact hold that a bond which is not specifically by its terms conditioned for the payment or satisfaction of the judgment but for the payment of costs and damages
cannot by contruction be given that effect.

The authorities

covering this issue are annotated at 124 A.L.R. 501.5

The

authorities cited in the annotation, however, are by no means
uniform.

The majority of state cases mentioned in the

annotation6 hold that the bond cannot be construed to
extend to the judgment (although many of
appeal bonds not operating as a supersedeas).

cases deal with
The majority

of the federal cases, and a minority of the state cases cited
in the annotation squarely hold that an appeal bond, although
in terms not conditioned for the payment of the judgment, but
for the payment of all costs and damages, may be construed to
have that effect, particularly where it is a supersedeas bond
and the appeal is made to operate as a supersedeas on the
judgment.

No Utah cases are shown in the annotation.

The

annotation further cites a controlling principle as follows

5 124 A.L.R. 501. "Condition of bond on appeal not in terms
covering payment of money judgment, as having that effect by
implication or construction."
6 At 5 AM. JUR.2d, Appeal and Error §1054, this now appears
to be cited as a minority position.
- 9 -

rPage 501):
"This rule (of strict construction) does not imply that
a strained construction is to be put on the words of
a bond in favor of the surety. The rule of strict
construction, as applied to contracts of suretyship and
guarantors, in no way interferes with the use of the
ordinary tests by which the actual meaning and
intention of contracting parties are ordinarily
determined".
The issue before the Court in the instant case involves the
construction of a specific and a unique instrument.

The

facts are not similar to any authority cited by the sureties.
None of the cases upon which they rely involve a situation
where the statute requires that the bond be conditioned upon
payment of the judgment; where the bond is in fact given for
the exact amount of the judgment; where the instrument is
designated by its title as a supersedeas bond; where a simultaneous separate cost bond is given; and where interest under
the bond specifically is tied to the judgment date.

Here,

the intention of the parties was clear, and the Court should
so determine in accordance with the ordinary rules for construction of written contracts.
POINT II
A SUPERSEDEAS BOND IS EFFECTIVE UPON DELIVERY
Counsel for the sureties argued to the lower court that
a supersedeas bond is not effective at all until approved by
the rourt.7

Here, neither the sureties nor their principal

7 Rule 62(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that
a stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by
the Court.
- 10 -

sought nor obtained court approval.
bond to obtain the stay.

They simply filed the

Birds made no objection to the sure-

ties under Rule 62(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; did not
challenge the bond for lack of Court approval; and made no
attempt to execute upon the judgment during the appeal.
Although Birds could have made a technical challenge, they
chose not to do so and relied upon the bond.

There is noth-

ing whatsoever in either Rule 73 or Rule 62, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure which states or implies that under such circumstances a duly executed and filed supersedeas bond becomes
ineffective.

Indeed, it seems rather surprising that the

sureties would seriously urge the Court to be relieved from a
solemn bond because of the failure to do something which
either they or their principals were required to do to perfeet the stay.
In any event, the law is clear that sureties on a bond
become legally liable even if a bond is insufficient to
effect a stay of execution.

This principle is discussed at

length in Merritt v. J. A. Stafford Company, 440 P.2d 927
(Cal. 1968) where the Court states as follows:
•rt has been held that undertakings may be enforced although not in exact conformity with
the statute, that the defect may be waived, that
the obligor is in no position to complain that
his obligation is less onerous than that provided for by statute, and that, where the
appellant has the benefit of the bond, the
obligor may not rely upon the fact that the
respondent could but did not object to the
sufficiency of the bond (authorities cited)."
- 11 -

See also the annotation at 120 A.L.R. 1062, where it is
stated as follows:
"The sureties generally are held liable on a supersedeas or appeal bond, although it was legally insufficient to effect a stay of proceedings,
as
a matter of fact there was in effect a stay, no
execution being issued, nor any attempt made to
collect an execution if issued, or to enforce the
judgment".
More than 50 cases are cited for the above statement.

The

annotation also points out that the receipt of the bond
itself furnishes a sufficient consideration for its
enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as cited
herein, it is respectfully urged that the judgment of
dismissal be reversed and the trial court directed to enter
judgment against the sureties.

The intention of the parties

was clear, and the supersedeas bond should be construed to
obligate the sureties for the payment of the judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST
David E. West
1300 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants
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APPENDIX I

MICHAEL W. PARK
PARK, BRAITHWAITE & EVES
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
Ray, Hansen, Randall and Bergstrom
110 North Main Street, Suite H
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: 586-6532
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAB
0-M INVESTMENTS, a Otllh,
limited partnership,

Plaintiff,
va.

)
)
)
)
)

)

)
)

SllPERSEDEAS BOND

DALE V. RAY and PHEBE RAY:
)
JAY C. HANSEN and ARDELLE H. )
HANSEN: BARRY RANDALL and
)
DEMA RANDALL: FRED BERGSTROM )
and CONNIE BERGSTROM; HOWARD )
THORLEY and TREVA PEG THORLEY)
w. GARY RINEHART and GENEVIVE)
RINEHART: LAWRENCE D. LAWLOR )
and BARBARA J. LAWLOR; TERREL)
L. BIRD and JANET L. BIRD,
).
Defendanta,
vs.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN TITLE AND
ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah
corporation and FRANltLIN H.
BUTTERFIELD,
Third-Party
Oefendanta.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

caae No. 18216

)

)

)
)

)

WHEREAS, defendanta/appellanta Ray, Hansen,
Randall and Bergstrom have appealed to the Supreme court
of the State of Otah from a Judgment dAted the 2lat day of
December, 1981 in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and
for Iron County, State of Utah (entitled aa above, Civil
No. 7563) in favor of defendants Terrel L. Bird and Janet

L. Bird for the total swn of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($128,500.00) with interest
thereon at the rate of TWELVE PERCENT (12') per annum from
December 29, 1981.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises
and of such appeal, the underaiqned,

ROSS A. RAY and

PERRY RAY
does hereby undertake and promise, on the part of
appellants, that said appellants will pay all damages and
costs which may be awarded against it on the appeal or on
a dismissal thereof, not exceeding, ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HllNDRED DOLLARS ($128,500.00),
with interest thereon at the rate of TWELVE PERCENT (12\)
per annum from December 29, 1981, to which amount the
ROSS

undersigned

A. RAY

and
itaelf

bound.
The undersigned,

ROSS

A. RAY

and

itself to the jurisdiction of the Fifth Judicial District
Court of Iron County, State of Utah and irrevocably
appoints the Clerk of said court as its agent, upon whom
any paper• affecting it• liability, if any, may be
enforced on·motion without th• neceaaity of an independent
action.
DATED

this

APPENDIX II
(c) Bond on Appeal. At the lime of filing the notice of
appeal, the appellant shall file with such notice a bond for costs
on appeal, unless such bond is waived in writing by the adverse
party, or unless an affidavit as hereinafter described is filed.
The bond shall be in the sum of $300.00 unless a supersedeas
bond is filed, in which event no separate bond on appeal is re·
quired. The bond on appeal shall be with sufficient sureties and
shall be conditioned lo secure the payment of costs if the appeal
is dismissed or the judgment affirmed, or of such costs as the
appellate court may award if the judgment is modified. The
adverse party may except lo the sufficiency of the sureties in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 62(i). If the appellant
makes and files with the clerk of the court from which the appeal
is taken, an affidavit in the form set out in section 21-7-3, Utah
Code Annotated !953, no bond on appeal shall be required.
(d) Supcrsedeas Bond. Whenever an appellant entitled there·
lo desires a stay on appeal, he may present to the court for its
approval a supersedeas bond which shall have such surety or
sureties :is the court requires. The bond shall be conditioned for
the satisfaction of the judgment in full together with costs,
interest, and
for delay, if for any reason the appeal is
dismissed or if the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full
such modification of the judgment and such costs, interest, and
damages as the appellate court may adjudge and award. When
the judgment is for the recovery of money not otherwise secured,
the amount of the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will cover
the whole amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs
on the appeal, interest, and damages for delay, unless the court
after notice and hearing and for good cause shown fixes a different
amount or orders security other than the bond. When the judgment determines the disposition of the properly in controversy as
in real actions, replevin, and actions lo foreclose mortgages or
when such property is in the custody of the sheriff or when the
proceeds of such property or a bond for its value is in the custody
or control of the court, the amount of the supersedeas bond shall
I.Jc fixed at such sum only as will secure the amount recovered
for the use and detention of the property, the costs of the action,
costs on appeal, interest, and damages for delay.
(e) Failure to File or Insufficiency of Bond. If a bond on
appeal or a supersedeas bond is not filed within the time specified,
or if the bond filed is found insufficient, and if the record on
appeal has not been filed in the Supreme Court, a bond may be
filed al such time before the record is so filed as may be fixed
by the district court. After the record is so filed, application for
leave lo file a bond may be made only in the Supreme Court.
(f) Judgment Against Surety. The bond or undertaking given
pursuant to subdivisions (c) and (d) of the Rule, shall, in addition
lo other requirements, provide that each surety submits himself
to the jurisdiction of the district court and irrevocably appoints
the clerk of the court as his agent upon whom any papers affecting
his liability on the bond may be served, anc: that his liability may
be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent
action. The motion and such notice of the motions as the court
prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court who shall forth·
with mail copies to the surety if his address is known.

